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Israeli Counter-Terrorism: "Targeted Killings" Under
International Law
In light of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, leaders around the world are discussing how to respond to the
scourge of terrorism.' The State of Israel has been dealing with
terrorism for much of its fifty-three year existence and has employed
a variety of tactics in its ongoing battle.' Recently, Israel has engaged
in a counter-terrorist strategy commonly termed "targeted killings."3
Under this strategy, Israel actively responds to terror attacks and the
threat of future attacks, such as suicide bombings, by targeting
individuals it believes are involved in the planning and carrying out of
such violence This policy aims to prevent further attacks on Israeli
civilians and to minimize collateral damage to Palestinian civilians.5
1. See generally William Drozdiak, World Leaders, Citizens Send Condemnations and
Sympathy; But in Some Areas, Destruction Evokes Mixed Emotions, WASH. POST, Sept.
12, 2001, at A24 (quoting Russian President Vladimir Putin as denouncing "this terrible
tragedy" and saying that "the entire international community should unite in the struggle
against terrorism"); Steven Erlanger, European Nations Stand with U.S., Ready to
Respond, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A23 (quoting German chancellor Gerhard
Schroder as calling the attacks "a declaration of war against the entire civilized world" and
quoting European Union security chief Javier Solana as saying: "Consultations are under
way on both sides of the Atlantic, and the European Union stands firmly and fully behind
the United States.").
2. See CHAIM HERZOG, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST FROM THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE THROUGH LEBANON 46, 327-36
(1982) (describing the May 14, 1948 declaration of independence by David Ben-Gurion
and the war against terrorism since the early 1950s).
3. See generally Ina Friedman, Surgical Strikes?, JERUSALEM REP., Feb. 12, 2001, at
20, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Report File (describing how the policy
"debuted spectacularly last November 9" with the helicopter missile strike that killed
Hussein Abayat, a 34-year-old leader of the Fatah-linked Tanzim militia); Clyde
Haberman, Israel Defends Missile Attack That Killed 8, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at A8
(noting other labels used such as "liquidation," "interception," and the proposed use of a
new phrase, "actions to prevent the killing of Jews"); Arieh O'Sullivan, IDF Kills Two
Key Hamas Terrorists,JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 1, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Jerusalem Post File ("Israel acknowledged that it had carried out what the
defense establishment calls a 'targeted killing.' ").
4. See Friedman, supra note 3 (describing how Israeli officials refer to the policy as
"preemptive attacks on terrorists operating out of the areas under Palestinian control");
O'Sullivan, supra note 3 (describing an individual who was targeted as "one of the
coordinators of bomb manufacturing and the dispatching of suicide bombers").
5. See Herb Keinon, Peres Warns Targeted Killings to Continue, JERUSALEM POST,
Dec. 23, 2001, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post File (reporting
comments by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres that "Israel will continue with its policy of
preventing terrorism on its own" even in light of Hamas's and Islamic Jihad's
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Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, testifying before

the U.S. House of Representatives' Government Reform Committee
after the September 11 attacks, commented: "Israel's policy of
preemptively striking at those who seek to murder its people is, I
believe, better understood today and requires no further
Netanyahu's sentiment is arguably quite
elaboration. '6
understandable following the September 11 attacks on the United
States. In fact, U.S. policy makers, in addition to launching a
conventional assault in Afghanistan, are contemplating counterterrorist strategies similar to those used by the Israelis.7

In light of the resurgence of terrorism in Israel8 and the broader
international community, this Recent Development will analyze the
Israeli counter-terrorist actions under relevant international law.
Based on an analysis of customary international law,9 current treaties,

and the United Nations Charter, Israel's policy of targeted killings
does not contravene international law.

The policy is not one of

"assassination" as defined by customary international law, and the
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense ° renders it a legal, defensible
policy in the fight against terrorism.

announcements "that they have suspended suicide attacks inside Israel"); Haberman,
supra note 3 (reporting the suggestion by Israeli officials that stopping a suicide bomber
before he strikes will avert an inevitable massive Israeli reprisal, thus saving Palestinian
lives); Charles Krauthammer, In Defense of "Assassination,"TIME, Aug. 27, 2001, at 32,32
(arguing that serving terrorists with subpoenas is "ludicrous" and attempting to arrest
them would involve the invasion of Palestinian cities and the likely deaths of many
civilians).
6. Benjamin Netanyahu, Address to the U.S. House of Representatives'
Government Reform Committee (Sept. 20, 2001), reprinted in We Are All Targets,
JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 24,2001, at 6, availableat LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post
File.
7. See Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs 'Targeted Killing' Missions, WASH. POST, Oct.
28, 2001, at Al (describing the conclusion by the Bush administration based on classified
legal memoranda that "executive orders banning assassination do not prevent the
President from lawfully singling out a terrorist for death by covert action").
8. See Keith B. Richburg, Albright Intercedes in Arab-Israeli Strife: Barak, Arafat
Meet in Stormy Summit, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2000, at Al (describing the violence as "the
bloodiest in Israel and the Palestinian territories since 1996"); Keith B. Richburg, Clashes
Resurge at Sacred Sites: 9 PalestiniansKilled in 'Day of Rage,' WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2000,
at Al (reporting the death toll of the clashes as surpassing that of 1996, "when the
previous major explosion of violence took place").
9. Customary international law refers to the legal obligation created by the
"conjunction of a general practice of states with states' belief that they are legally obliged
to adhere to the practice." A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF
STATES SINCE WORLD WAR 112 (1997).
10. See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
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Before engaging in a thorough legal analysis, the appropriate
context must be determined. While the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
defies precise legal definition, 2 it does fit a general definition. The

nature of the violence-Palestinian attacks, Israeli forceful responses,
law
whether before or after-suggests two likely options:
enforcement or armed conflict. A hypothetical is instructive. If an
Israeli citizen (or Palestinian for that matter) staged terrorist attacks
from within Israeli territory, the use of "targeted killings" in response
would likely be considered a law enforcement action. Such action
could be considered analogous to domestic police forces setting up
snipers to take out murderers without judicial proceedings. Judged in
this context, "targeted killings" would likely be labeled "extrajudicial

executions."13 However, the reality of the situation does not conform
to or match this hypothetical. Terrorists launch their attacks from
outside of Israel, from Palestinian-controlled territory. 4

Attacks

11. For example, in domestic law, one would need to determine whether an issue is
one of federal or state jurisdiction, whether it involves the law of torts or contracts, and
whether it should be decided based on statutes or case law, to name just a few necessary
contexts. International law involves similar inquiries, for example, is a treaty on point,
does the law of the sea or the law of warfare apply, and what controlling principles of
customary international law exist.
12. Such a definition is beyond the scope of this Recent Development and is not
necessary to the conclusions reached herein.
13. Amnesty International defines the term as follows:
An extrajudicial execution is an unlawful and deliberate killing carried out by
order of a government or with its acquiescence. Extrajudicial killings are killings
which can reasonably be assumed to be the result of a policy at any level of
government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to arresting them
and bringing them to justice. These killings take place outside any judicial
framework.
Amnesty International, Israelandthe Occupied Territories: State Assassinationsand Other
Unlawful Killings, Feb. 21, 2001, available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai/nsf/Index/
MDE150052001?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES/ISRAEL%5OCCUPIED+TERRIT
ORIES (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Amnesty International,
State Assassinations and Other Unlawful Killings]. While this hypothetical involved
domestic jurisdiction, extra-judicial executions are condemned under international law.
The United Nations' Economic and Social Council has drafted a recommendation of
principles condemning extra-judicial executions. See U.N. High Commissionerfor Human
Rights, Principleson the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, E.S.C. Res. 1989/65, Annex, U.N. ESCOR 1st Sess. Supp. No. 1,
at 52-53, U.N. Doc. E/1989/89 (1989), available at http:llwwwl.umn.edu/humanrtslinstree/
i7pepi.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Amnesty International,
Israel/Occupied Territories: State Assassination Policy Must Stop, July 4, 2001, availableat
(referring to the
http://web.amnesty.orglai.nsf/print/MDE150632001?OpenDocument
actions taken by Israeli security forces as "extrajudicial executions") (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
14. See generally O'Sullivan, supra note 3 (documenting the career of Hamas terrorist
Jamil Jadallah, who operated out of Hebron in the West Bank and was considered
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emanating from a foreign territory more readily fit into an armed
conflict paradigm.15 Although both sides seem content with using the
language of war, their views of "targeted killings" vary immensely.
The Palestinians condemn the Israeli actions as "assassinations" and
"extrajudicial executions," while the Israelis argue the killings are
justified as self-defense.16 Although the involved parties' opinions are
responsible by the Israelis for attacks in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Netanya, and other cities in
Israel proper).
15. Both sides seem to agree that the current situation more closely resembles a state
of war than a state of peace. See Evelyn Gordon, War is Not Criminal Justice,
JERUSALEM POST, July 31, 2001, at 8, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post
File (describing how Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and most Fatah organizations see themselves
"as armed soldiers fighting a war"); Lee Hockstader, Key Militant Escapes From
PalestinianJail,WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2000, at A45 ("Arafat has tightened relations with
Hamas in an effort to forge a unified political front during what many Palestinians
consider a war."); Harry Levins, Military Experts Debate Moral Ramifications of Killing
Leaders, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2001, at A10, available at 2001 WL 4475328
(quoting Israeli Cabinet Minister Ephraim Sneh as saying, "Anyone who thinks the war
against terrorism is a ping-pong war simply doesn't understand it."); Nomi Morris &
Andrea Gerlin, Barak, Arafat Discuss Ceasefire at Talks in Paris, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 5, 2000, at A35, available at 2000 WL 26088007 (quoting Hamas spiritual
leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin as saying, "This war marks the end of a peace process that has
never worked. The way to achieve our rights is through resistance."); Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions: Palestinian Violence and
Terrorism; The International War Against Terrorism, at http://www.mfa.gov.illmfa/
go.asp?MFAH0i9o0 ("Israel is engaged in a situation best defined as an armed conflict.")
(last visited Jan. 13, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Press Briefing by
Colonel Daniel Reisner, Head of the International Law Branch of the Israel Defense
Forces Legal Division, (Nov. 15, 2000), at http:llwww.mfa.gov.illmfalgo.asp?MFAHOiaqO
("I think I would be quoting the Attorney General... saying that the current situation has
more of a semblance of war than of peace.") (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); see also KHALED HROUB, HAMAS: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 24251 (2000) (describing Hamas military action to liberate Palestine and quoting Hamas
Charter, Article 13, "There is no solution to the Palestinian problem except though
But see Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding
struggle (jihad)") (emphasis in original).
Committee, The Mitchell Plan, (Apr. 30, 2001), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawwebl
avalon/mideast/mitchellplan.htm (criticizing the Israeli government's position that "Israel is
engaged in an armed conflict short of war" as overly broad) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
16. For the Palestinian position, see Levins, supra note 15 (stating that Palestinians
denounce the killings as "extra-judicial executions"); Deborah Sontag & William A. Orme
Jr., ExasperatedArafat Says U.S. Should Do More, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001, at 6 (citing a
letter from Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasir Arafat to President Bush in which
Arafat refers to "Israeli-sponsored assassinations"); Deborah Sontag, Israel Hunts Down
and Kills a Top Arafat Security Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at A3 (quoting
Palestinian officials condemning Israel as acting like "a state above the law" in its use of
assassinations). For the Israeli position, see Joel Greenberg, Israel Affirms Policy of
Assassinating Militants, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A5 (citing Israeli cabinet ministers
describing the policy as "active self-defense" or "interception" of terrorists before they
strike); Clyde Haberman, At Least 14 Dead as Suicide Bomber Strikes Jerusalem, N.Y.

2002]

TARGETED KILLINGS

1073

inherently biased, the law of warfare still provides the most
appropriate framework for analysis. 7 The laws of war offer the
maximum protection of combatants, while also placing certain
responsibilities on all parties involved. 8 Thus, it is appropriate to

TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at Al (citing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's defense of the

tactic as an act of self-defense).
17. While the legal status of Palestinian militants is hotly debated, and beyond the
scope of this Recent Development, the law of warfare is the most appropriate framework
for analysis for several reasons. First, as discussed above, law enforcement does not fit.
The acts being committed against Israel are not just criminal, they are more of the nature
of "armed attacks." Second, these "armed attacks" are coming from outside of Israel
proper. Granted, the territories are "occupied," but the Palestinian Authority has control
over the vast majority of the Palestinian population. Finally, the law of warfare offers
maximum protection to those engaging in hostilities and civilians. A cursory view of the
world today reveals how governments often brutally suppress internal uprisings, for
example, Chechnya, but when the conflict rises to the level of true armed conflict, the laws
of war require protections, such as humane treatment of POWs, while also placing certain
responsibilities on all parties involved. See generally Geneva Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (mandating humane treatment of civilians
and members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms; prohibiting the taking of
hostages; and much more); Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 (same).
18. The U.N. General Assembly has adopted resolutions to bring groups such as the
Palestinians under the protection of the laws of war. In particular, it has sought to apply
the legal status of combatants under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to "persons engaged in
armed struggle against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes." See Basic
Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien
Dominationand Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at
142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). Israel and the United States have opposed resolutions such
as this one. The first Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions uses similar
language. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]. The United States and
Israel oppose these extensions of the Geneva protections to so-called wars of national
liberation. See Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan, Protocol II
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Noninternational Armed Conflicts, S. Treaty Doc. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., at III
(1987), reprinted in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987) (requesting advice and consent to
ratification of Protocol II, but rejecting Protocol I as "fundamentally and irreconcilably
flawed," and stating that its repudiation is an "additional step, at the ideological level so
important to terrorist organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as international
actors"); Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva
Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 678 (1994) ("[B]ecause of fears that Protocol I would
legitimize the claims of the Palestine Liberation Organization to prisoner-of-war privileges
for its combatants and promote various liberation movements to state or quasi-state
status, the Protocol attracted vigorous opposition in the United States and Israel."). The
United States has signed but not ratified this treaty, while Israel has neither signed nor
ratified. See BURTON H. WESTON ET AL., SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER

1286-87 (3d ed. 1997) (listing signatories).
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analyze targeted killings under the broad category of international

law relating to the conduct of war.
Because many critics of "targeted killings" find it helpful to label
the practice "assassination,"' 9 the applicability of that term requires
The term "assassination," under customary
examination.
international law, generally is "understood to mean the selected
The
killing of an individual enemy by treacherous means. "20
procurement of another to act treacherously is included in
"treacherous means," while treachery itself is21 "understood as a
breach of a duty of good faith toward the victim.
Twentieth century attempts to codify an assassination standard
confirm this definition. Article 23(b) of the Hague Regulations
forbids "kill[ing] or wound[ing] treacherously individuals belonging
to the hostile nation or army."' The U.S. Army manual, The Law of
Land Warfare, explicitly interprets Article 23(b) to apply to acts of
assassination.13 Furthermore, the Nuremberg Tribunal found that the
19. See supra note 13; see also Vincent Cannistraro, Assassination Is Wrong-And
Dumb, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2001, at A29 (condemning Israeli "assassinations" as
"neither effective nor moral"); Lee Hockstader, Assassination'sAftermath, WASH. POST,
Aug. 2,2001, at Al (using the term "assassination" repeatedly).
20. Patricia Zengel, Assassination and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L.
REv. 615, 622 (1992). Zengel reviews the writings of early commentators on the subject
and states that the consensus "was that an attack directed at an enemy, including an
enemy leader, with the intent of killing him was generally permissible, but not if the attack
was a treacherous one. Treachery was defined as betrayal by one owing an obligation of
good faith to the intended victim." Id. at 621; see also Michael N. Schmitt, State-Sponsored
Assassinationin Internationaland Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609, 613-18 (1992)
(summarizing the writings of early commentators and concluding that (1) "scholars appear
to have placed no absolute prohibition on seeking the death of one's enemy by
unconventional means," and (2) "the term 'treachery,' a critical component in the current
law of armed conflict, is designed as a breach of confidence by an assailant"). An example
of an act that would involve a breach of good faith owed to one's victim would be the use
of the internationally recognized symbol of the Red Cross or Red Crescent to get close to
the unsuspecting enemy. Using the white flag of surrender to trick the enemy would be
another example.
21. Zengel, supra note 20, at 622.
22. Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and
Regulations Annexed Thereto, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 23(b), 36 Stat. 2277, 2302 (cited in
Schmitt, supra note 20, at 630) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
23. The manual reprints Article 23, par. (b) of the Hague Regulations, and adds the
following commentary:
This article is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of
an enemy, or putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward
for an enemy "dead or alive." It does not, however, preclude attacks on
individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities,
occupied territory, or elsewhere.
DEP'T OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, NO. 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 17
(1956). Schmitt finds this incorporation of the wartime assassination ban as evidence
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Hague prohibition, in addition to its binding character with respect to
signatory states, had passed into customary international law.24 The
latest codification attempt, Protocol I of the Protocols Additional to

the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, retains a slightly
modified form of the prohibition on assassination.25 Article 37 of

Protocol I outlaws killing, injuring, or capturing an adversary by
resort to perfidy, and defines perfidy as "[a]cts inviting the confidence

of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is
obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law
26
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.

The concept of perfidy is broader than treachery, and the effect of the
Protocol was to absorb the concept of assassination and treat it under
the broader prohibition of perfidious attacks on persons in general.27
Although Israel is not a party to either the Hague Regulations or
Protocol I, as noted above, the Hague prohibition on assassination
has passed into customary international law. Furthermore, both
treaties support the international community's attempt to codify the
customary international law standard defining assassination as the
treacherous killing of a selected individual enemy.
State practice assumes a very important role in determining what
constitutes international law governing assassination due to the
scarcity of treaty provisions covering the subject. 8 Generally,
because there is no legislature to make the law and no sovereign to
enforce it, international law is based largely on consent. States can
consent to be bound by treaties and they can express their approval of

that it has entered the operational code. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 631 (using the
analytical term "operational code" coined by Michael Reisman and James E.Baker).
24. See International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences (Oct.
1,1946), reprintedin 41 AM. J. INT'L L.248-49 (1947).
25. Protocol I, supra note 18 (cited in Schmitt, supra note 20, at 631).
26. Protocol I, supra note 18, art. 37. An example of perfidy would be if a soldier
"approach[ed] a military post on the false pretext of being a peaceful civilian and then
open[ed] fire at close range." ESBJORN ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCrION AND
RELATED PROBLEMS 98 (1979).

27. Zengel, supra note 20, at 630.
28. Besides the prohibitions contained in the laws regulating warfare discussed above,
the only major treaties that expressly deal with assassinations are the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963), and the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 1, para. 1, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 618-19. Neither of these two treaties applies to this
discussion; thus, an examination of customary international law is necessary. The U.N.
Charter will be discussed later in the context of self-defense.
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customary international law through their actions.29 Accordingly, "if
practice determines the content of the law, it follows that the only
way to discover the content of the law is to examine practice."3
State practice, combined with the definition of assassination as a
"selected killing of an individual enemy by treacherous means,"
indicates that assassination is a rather narrow concept in international
law.3 1 States seem content with the historical "treacherous killing"
definition, as demonstrated by the absence of any comprehensive
treaty.32 The failure of states to condemn the assassination of Abu
Jihad in 1988 provides further evidence of states' unwillingness to
broaden the concept, perhaps because they felt they would take the

same sort of action, whether in response to terrorist activities directed
against their state or for other less acceptable reasons.33
Applying the above customary definition, Israel's recent4
"targeted killings" of terrorists do not qualify as assassinations.
Israel does not use treacherous means or perfidy in carrying out the
29. WEISBURD, supranote 9, at 13.
30. WEISBURD, supra note 9, at 13; see also id. at 10-13 (discussing the proposition
that, because the international legal system lacks a hierarchical structure, one must apply
an "obey-or-be-sanctioned" standard to determine whether a putative rule is in fact a rule
of the international legal system); Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread
on Us": InternationalLaw and Forcible State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J.
153, 156-59 (1994) (arguing that the two criteria to be used to determine if a putative rule
is genuinely "law" are (1) authority, meaning states accept the norm as legitimate and
binding, and (2) control, meaning that states actually comply with the rule through their
behavior); infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
31. This Recent Development has focused on the law of armed conflict and its
"treacherous killing" definition, see supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text, because
international norms regarding assassination are scarce outside the law of armed conflict.
See Schmitt, supranote 20, at 627.
32. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
33. On April 16, 1988, a team of Israeli commandos killed Khalil al-Wazir, also known
as Abu Jihad, a top P.L.O. military strategist, in his Tunis home because of his
involvement in several terrorist attacks against Israel. Tunisia complained to the United
Nations Security Council, but only claimed a violation of its sovereignty and territorial
integrity. Some of the states that downplayed the assassination issue were supporters of
the Palestine Liberation Organization, which approves of assassination, and had been
involved in such acts. Schmitt, supranote 20, at 626-27.
34. Although Palestinians denounce the Israeli strikes as "assassinations" or "extrajudicial executions," these assertions provoke disagreement from military experts. Levins,
supra note 15 (citing several experts in the field). Moreover, the United States, while
critical of the Israeli policy, does not use the term "assassination" in its criticisms. See id.
("U.S. officials have steered clear of the word 'assassination.' "); see also Janine Zacharia,
Sen. Biden Defends Targeted Killings, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 3, 2001, at 6A, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post File (quoting Senator Biden as stating, "I don't
believe this is a policy of assassinations. There is an [sic] effect a declared war, a
declaration by an organization that has said its goal is to do as much as it can (to kill Israeli
civilians).").
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attacks. Rather, the preferred method of attack is the use of missiles

fired from helicopters. This type of action is not treachery and is not
likely to invite confidence on behalf of the target that he is entitled to
protection under the international rules applicable to armed conflict. 6
Article 37 of Protocol I lists examples of actions that would constitute
perfidy, such as "the feigning of an intent to negotiate under a flag of
truce or of a surrender." 37 Examples of treachery would include a
soldier disguising himself as a doctor in order to gain access to a
general's tent where he would kill him or to feign surrender under the
Israel's use of39
well-understood symbol of the white flag.
conventional military attacks does not fit in the same category.
Although the policy aspects of employing such military means likely
will remain the subject of debate indefinitely, such actions do not
constitute "assassination" as that term has been defined throughout
history, 40 in customary international law,41 and recent attempts to
35. See generally Friedman, supra note 3 (describing a missile strike on Hussein
Abayat); Joel Greenberg, Widening Hostilities, Israel Kills Chief of P.L.O. Faction,N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28,2001, at A6 (describing a missile strike into the office of Abu Ali Mustafa,
chief of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine). The Israelis have also used
tanks to eliminate terrorists. See Levins, supra note 15 (describing a tank attack on a
Volkswagen).
36. A simple comparison will demonstrate that the Israeli actions do not offend any of
the above standards or prohibitions. Hunting down terrorists with an Apache helicopter is
not the same as loading a Red Cross/Red Crescent ambulance with commandos in order
to spring an ambush. Using the ambulance would be an act "inviting the confidence of an
adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection
under the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict." See Protocol I, supra
note 18, art. 37.
37. Id. at art. 37(a).
38. See Caspar W. Weinberger, When Can We Target the Leaders? 29 STRATEGIC
REv. 21, 23 (2001) (citing Thomas C. Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime Elites:
Assassination, Tyrannicide, and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 287,
300-01,306-09 (1999)).
39. While Israel employs conventional military means in its strikes, see e.g., supranote
3, critics are quick to point out that it does not always use conventional methods of attack.
For example, Israeli agents recently planted a bomb in the headrest of a car belonging to a
Palestinian collaborator. When the informant allowed Hamas terrorist Ibrahim BaniOudeh to borrow his car, the agents detonated the charge by remote control, literally
blowing his head off. Anatomy of an Assassination, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, (Aug.
2, 2001), at http:llstacks.msnbc.comlnews/608652.asp (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). This sort of action arguably qualifies as an "assassination." The Israeli agents
used an informant whom they knew the target would trust and then took advantage of this
trust to kill him.
40. See Zengel, supra note 20, at 617-21 (cataloging early commentators' definitions
of assassination and concluding that the consensus was "that an attack directed at an
enemy, including an enemy leader, with the intent of killing him was generally permissible,
but not if the attack was a treacherous one").
41. See Zengel, supra note 20, at 622; supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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codify the customary standard.42 But, the conclusion that Israel's
"targeted killings" do not constitute assassinations by no means ends
the analysis of their legality.4 3
Targeted killings are justified on the grounds of self-defensethey are a means to prevent in-progress and future terrorist attacks
that will kill Israeli civilians.44 Variants of this policy have proved
successful in the past.45 Although Israel considers the actions to be
self-defense, the question of whether these actions qualify as
legitimate self-defense under relevant international law demands
close scrutiny.
Self-defense law in the international law context derives
the U.N. Charter, customary
primarily from three sources:
international law, and state practice as evidence of custom. The U.N.
Charter was intended to establish a system whereby states would
solve their disputes peaceably, without resort to the use of force.46

Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states, "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity and political independence of any state or in any
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 47 An
exception to this prohibition exists, however. Article 51 provides:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken4
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.1
42. See Hague Convention, art. 23(b); supranotes 22-27 and accompanying text.
43. Schmitt, supra note 20, at 628 ("Simply because a killing is not assassination does
not mean that it is legal, or even justified.").
44. See Haberman, supra note 3 (quoting Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres as
stating, "[s]uicide bombers cannot be threatened by death. The only way to stop them is
to intercept those who send them," and describing use of the phrase "interception" as
suggesting "that people were killed as they were about to carry out a terrorist act."). Tel
Aviv University philosophy Professor Assa Kasher, author of the Israel Defense Forces
code of ethics, supports the policy of preemptive attacks provided the motive is
"preemption, not punishment." Friedman, supra note 3.
45. See Tracy Wilkinson, Response to Terror: Hard Lessons Learned, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, at All (describing how Israel encountered fewer attacks with fewer
casualties after a top Hamas bomb maker, known as "the Engineer," was killed). But see
Douglas Jehl, Arabs Say It Was Israel That Set Off Cycle of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2001, at A8 (reporting that Hamas cited the killing of one of its leaders as a cause for the
deadly suicide bombings carried out the weekend of December 1-2,2001).
46. U.N. CHARTER, pmbl. (listing as one of the Charter's goals "to maintain
international peace and security" and stating "that armed force shall not be used, save in
the common interest").
47. Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
48. Id. at art. 51.
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Both of these provisions are subject to widely varying
interpretations.49 To determine whether Israel can rightly classify its
actions as self-defense, this discussion will focus on Article 51 and the
right of self-defense.

The differing interpretations of Article 51 fall into two basic
categories-the restrictive view and the liberal view. Those adhering
to the restrictive view argue that the Charter, while preserving the
inherent right of self-defense, at the same time is limited by the

phrase "if an armed attack occurs," contained in Article 51.50 Textual
analysis supports this view, as the right preserved and stated to be
unimpaired is qualified by the words, "if an armed attack occurs,"
meaning that the "unimpaired customary right is safeguarded only in
the situation of armed attack. ' 51 Some proponents of the restrictive
view argue that self-defense can only be used against an armed attack
directed against a state's "territorial integrity or political
'
independence."52
The International Court of Justice's opinion in
Nicaraguav. United States employed this rationale. 3
In contrast, the liberal view holds that Article 51 in no way limits

the right of self-defense under customary international law.
Furthermore, under this view, states may act in self-defense in cases
of armed attacks as well as threats of imminent attacks and to

49. See infranotes 50-59 and accompanying text.
50. See DR. SuBHAS C. KHARE, USE OF FORCE UNDER UNITED NATIONS CHARTER
83 (1985); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 183--85
(2d ed. 1994) (stating that Article 51's choice of words is deliberately restrictive and that
the Article confines self-defense to responding to an armed attack); Abraham D. Sofaer,
The Sixth Annual WaldemarA. Solf Lecture in InternationalLaw: Terrorism,the Law, and
the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 93 (1989) (discussing how some writers view
the language of Article 51 as limiting the use of force only to defend against an armed
attack against a member state's territory); Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International
Law, and the Use of MilitaryForce, 18 WIS. INT'L LU. 145, 160-62 ("A significant number
of writers argue that an armed attack is the exclusive circumstance in which the use of
armed force is sanctioned under Article 51.").
51. KHARE, supra note 50, at 84-85.
52. See Sofaer, supra note 50, at 93-96 (discussing and rejecting the view of
proponents of a restrictive interpretation).
53. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. United States), 1986 I.CJ. 14, 119
(June 27) (concluding that the limited intervention involved could not justify resort to selfdefense because, under customary law, use of force is only allowed in response to an
"armed attack," which does not include "assistance to rebels in the form of the provision
of weapons or logistical or other support"). Sofaer criticizes the decision as having no
support in customary international law or the practice of states, and concludes that the
court's solution allowing "countermeasures" erroneously suggests that a terrorist attack
"is necessarily a less serious form of aggression than a conventional attack, and thus a less
legitimate basis for the defensive use of force." Sofaer, supra note 50, at 93-94.
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safeguard other rights. 4 The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense
constitutes a significant element of the liberal view. Anticipatory selfdefense involves the use of force by states in "anticipation" of an
armed attack.55 Because the Charter neither expressly prohibits nor
allows anticipatory self-defense, all relevant rules of treaty
construction may be used in its interpretation, including the axiom
that treaties only limit nations' rights to the extent that they have
explicitly agreed to be so limited.5 6 The negotiating history of the
Charter comports with this view, as the travaux prepatoires "suggest
only that Article 51 should safeguard the existing right of self-defense
and not restrict it." 57
A plausible argument can be made that Article 51 codifies the
customary right of self-defense under the expansive view, making it
necessary to define this right." The fact that the U.N. Charter

preserves the right of self-defense in the case of an actual armed
attack provides strong evidence that customary international law
59
recognizes this right at a minimum.

54. See KHARE, supra note 50, at 85. These other rights include the right of political
independence, territorial integrity, protection of lives and property of nationals, and
economic rights. Id. at 85 n.47 (citing D.W. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 24 (1958)).
55. See DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 182-83. Professor Dinstein adheres to the
restrictive view that force can be used only in response to actual use of force by the other
party. Id. at 184. However, another school of thought maintains that Article 51 merely
highlights one form of self-defense (i.e., response to an armed attack), and that it does not
prohibit other forms of legitimate self-defense allowed by customary international law. Id.
at 184-85 (citing BOWETT, supra note 54, at 187-92); MYRES SMITH MCDOUGAL &
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL
REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL COERCION 232-41 (1961); JULIUS STONE,
AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 44 (1958)).

56. Gregory Francis Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal
Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 177,204 (1987).
57. Id. Intoccia also cites testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
for the proposition that the negotiating history supports the more expansive view. Id.
Professor Mallision testified that the "words 'inherent right' in the English text also
include anticipatory self-defense, since the term refers to the pre-existing customary law
which is incorporated by reference." Id. (citing The IsraeliAir Strike: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 218, 226 (1981) (Sup. Doc. No.
Y4.F76/2:1s712) (testimony of Professor W. T. Mallison)).
58. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text; see also DINSTEIN, supranote 50, at
182-83 (stating that the common opinion is that customary law accords states the right of
self-defense as a "preventive measure"); Sofaer, supra note 50, at 94 ("The United States
rejects the notion that the U.N. Charter supersedes customary international law on the
right of self defense.").
59. The ICJ's decision in the Nicaragua case held that customary international law
allowed the use of force in self-defense against an "armed attack." See supra note 53 and
accompanying text.
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The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense, on the other hand, is
more controversial. The Caroline case' generally is regarded as
61
authoritative precedent for the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense.
The diplomatic exchange that took place between the United States
and Britain provided the traditional formulation of the doctrine of
self-defense, which incorporated anticipatory measures, as stated by
Secretary of State Daniel Webster. 62 Webster declared that for an act
to qualify as self-defense, a state must show the "necessity of that selfdefense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and
no moment for deliberation." 63 Webster's statement includes three
conditions:
necessity, proportionality, and immediacy.64
The
necessity requirement has been interpreted to provide that force is
the only available means of self-defense and that no other peaceful
means would be effective. 5 The conditions of proportionality and
immediacy require the response to be proportional to the armed
attack and timed to respond immediately or to anticipate an
imminent threat. 6
Although these are certainly stringent

requirements, the customary formulation allows for anticipatory selfdefense because there will be situations in which a state will be able
to meet these requirements
in response to a threat that is less than an
67
actual use of armed force.

60. The Carolinecase began with the destruction of the steamer Carolineduring the
See 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-14 (1906). There was much sympathy among Americans
along the Canadian border, and the United States was attempting to enforce the neutrality
laws. Id.However, a force of about one thousand well-armed men were able to set up
camp on Navy Island, in Upper Canada, and they were using steamer Caroline in
communicating with the mainland. Id The destruction was accomplished when British
forces boarded the steamer, attacked those on board, set it on fire, and set it adrift over
the Niagara Falls. Id.Following the incident, the United States demanded redress from
Britain and a series of diplomatic exchanges commenced. Id.; see also R.Y. Jennings, The
Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82-92 (1938) (describing the incident that
came to be known as the Carolinecase).
61. See DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 182, 244; Intoccia, supra note 56, at 201.
62. Intoccia, supra note 56, at 201.
63. MOORE, supra note 60, at 412.
64. DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 244.

1837 insurrection in Canada.

65. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 152

(1991).
66. Maureen F. Brennan, Comment, Avoiding Anarchy: Bin Laden Terrorism, the
U.S. Response, and the Role of Customary InternationalLaw, 59 LA. L. REV. 1195, 1202
(1999).
67. Schachter proposes as an example of valid preemptive self-defense an armed
action to rescue hostages who are in imminent danger. SCHACHTER, supra note 65, at
152-53.
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While support exists that Israel's actions are consistent with
anticipatory self-defense,6s international law imposes another
hurdle-the illegality of armed reprisals. 69 Because Israel's responses
often come after a terrorist attack has occurred, a determination of

whether these actions constitute "reprisals" is necessary. Armed
reprisals are "measures of counter-force, short of war, undertaken by
one State against another in response to an earlier violation of
international law."'7 Very few propositions of international law are as
widely supported as the proposition that the use of force by way of
reprisals is illegal under the U.N. Charter.7 1 Self-defense and reprisals

are distinguished by their purpose. Self-defense measures seek to
protect the security of the state, whereas reprisals are punitive in

character.7 a However, when one considers the whole context in which
acts of violence occur, as opposed to particular incidents, the line
between protection and retribution becomes obscure. 73 Professor
Dinstein observes that "defensive armed reprisals" may be allowed if
they qualify as an exercise of self-defense under Article 51.7

He

further argues that to "be defensive, and therefore lawful, armed
reprisals must be future-oriented, and not limited to a desire to

punish past transgressions. 7 5
In addition to the distinction made by Professor Dinstein, other
commentators have argued that governmental elites, as a practical
matter, tolerate the use of force in reprisals. 76 The practice of

characterizing military actions as self-defense when in the factual
sense they are reprisals demonstrates the emergence of an implicit

68. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
69. See infra note 71.
70. DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 216.
71. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 223
(1963); LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS 102 (2d ed. 1949); Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force,
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1972).
72. See Bowett, supra note 70, at 3.
73. William V. O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror
Operations,30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 423 (1990).
74. DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 216. Defensive armed reprisals "must come in
response to an armed attack, as opposed to other violations of international law, in
circumstances satisfying all the requirements of legitimate self-defence." Id.
75. Id. at 222.
76. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & JAMES E. BAKER, REGULATING COVERT ACrION
90 (1992) ("States were resorting to what amounted to acts of reprisal, and whether
explicitly or implicitly, claiming a right to do so."); Jules Lobel, The Use of Force to
Respond to TerroristAttacks: The Bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 537,542 (1999) (noting the argument by some that, "as a practical matter, governmental
elites tolerate forceful reprisals despite the formal strictures of the U.N. Charter").
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acceptance of forceful countermeasures.7 7 Whether one accepts the
stringent view that all reprisals are illegal or the more lenient view
that "defensive reprisals" are permissible, international law prohibits
the use of force in a punitive manner.78 Consistent with the
customary conditions on self-defense, forceful actions must be futureoriented. 79
Due to the prominent role of state practice in customary
international law, specific instances of self-defense oriented uses of
force provide evidence that Israeli "targeted killings" comport with
international norms and are not illegal reprisals.8' The most recent
non-Israeli uses of force justified on grounds of self-defense involved
the United States. First, in 1986, the United States conducted a
bombing raid on Libya in response to terrorist attacks against U.S.
civilians and servicemen.81 One year before the Libya raid, the United
States abstained from a Security Council vote condemning an Israeli
attack on Tunisia. 2 While the United States opposed the Israeli
action on the basis of policy, and not legal, grounds, U.S. Ambassador
Vernon Walters made an important statement regarding the U.S.
stance on self-defense.
In this statement, made well before September 11, 2001, the
Ambassador commented that the United States "recognize[s] and
strongly support[s] the principle that a state subjected to continuing
terrorist attacks may respond with appropriate use of force to defend
77. REISMAN & BAKER, supra note 76, at 102; see also O'Brien, supra note 73, at 422
(discussing how the proposition that reprisals are illegal has acquired a credibility gap,
related to the divergence between international law and the actual practice of states).
Lobel points out the broader claim that, whatever the justification employed, some states
such as the United States "are in practice maintaining the option to use force unilaterally
in a wider set of circumstances than those suggested by the narrow strictures of Article
51." Lobel, supra note 76, at 542.
78. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MIcH. L. REV.
1620, 1638 (1984) (" '[D]efensive retaliation' may be justified where a state has good
reason to expect a series of attacks from the same source and such retaliation serves as a
deterrent or protective action. However, a reprisal for revenge or as a penalty (or
'lesson') would not be defensive.").
79. See DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 222.
80. See supra notes 46-79 and accompanying text. While the reasoning may seem
circular, state practice is vitally important to the formation of principles of international
law. See WEISBURD, supra note 9, at 13 ("If practice determines the content of the law, it
follows that the only way to discover the content of the law is to examine practice.").
While the practice of Israel is important, looking at the practice of another state, namely
the United States, is more appropriate and provides a more objective basis for analyzing
the development of customary international law. In other words, it is more objective to
see what another state has done rather than to judge Israel by its own actions.
81. See generallyIntoccia, supra note 56 (discussing U.S. action).
82. Sofaer, supranote 50, at 108.
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against further attacks. This is an aspect of the inherent right of selfdefense recognized in the U.N. Charter. '83 Consistent with
Ambassador Walters' statement, following the Libya raid, he
defended the action on the grounds of self-defense, and used no
language that could be construed as justifying the raid under a
reprisal theory. Referring to the terrorist bombing of a West German
discotheque in which Americans were killed, Walters said, "In light of
this reprehensible act of violence-only the latest in an ongoing
pattern of attacks by Libya-and clear evidence that Libya is
planning a multitude of future attacks, the United States was
compelled to exercise its rights of self-defense. ' The United States
was criticized for its action by some U.N. members, but it joined
France and Great Britain in vetoing a Security Council Resolution
condemning the raid. 5 Thus, the states' reactions offers little
instruction as to state practice regarding this use of force 86 The U.S.
statements regarding the action are instructive, however, at least to
the extent that they comport with principles outlined above regarding
the use of force in self-defense, and not as a reprisal.87 The United
States seems to be advocating the expansive or liberal view that
Article 51 did not supersede the customary right of self-defense,
83. Statement before the U.N. Security Council on Oct. 4, 1985, U.N. SCOR, 40th
Sess., 2615th mtg. at 22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2615 (1985), reprinted in Off. of the Historian,
U.S. Dep't of State, 1985 Am. Foreign Policy Current Doc. 232 (Sup. Docs. No. S1.712:985) (statement of U.S. Ambassador Vernon Walters) (analyzing the U.S. bombing of
Libya under international law of self-defense); see also Authorization for Use of Military
Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 ("Whereas, such acts render it both necessary
and appropriate that the United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect
United States citizens both at home and abroad."); Alan Cowell, Blair Declares the
Airstrikes Are an Act of Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 2001, at B6 (quoting British
Prime Minister Tony Blair saying, "[w]e have a direct interest in acting in our self-defense
to protect British lives"); Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Advises U.N. Council More Strikes
Could Come, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,2001, at B5 (quoting letter from U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N., John Negroponte, as saying, "[w]e may find that our self-defense requires further
actions with respect to other organizations and other states" and describing U.S. and
British formal notification of its military actions in Afghanistan pursuant to Article 51 of
the U.N. Charter).
84. 86 DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2111, June 1986, at 19.
85. Bernard Weinraub, U.S. Says Allies Asked for More in Libya Attack, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 1986, at Al. The breakdown of the votes indicates a strong influence of politics.
Bulgaria, China, and the Soviet Union were among those voting in favor of the resolution.
Id.
86. The fact that the United States' allies voted against the resolution, while its
adversaries voted for it, makes determining whether those votes were based on legal
analysis or foreign policy calculations difficult.
87. See Intoccia, supra note 56, at 190-91 (describing President Reagan's self-defense
justification for the attack and Ambassador Walters's statement to the U.N., which lacked
language that could be construed as advocating a reprisal theory for the raid).
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which included anticipatory measures. 8 By avoiding the use of a
reprisal theory justification, which would have been much easier in
light of the terrorist attacks, the United States indicated that its
actions were consistent with the U.N. Charter.8 9

Another recent use of force justified on self-defense grounds was
the U.S. raid on Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the 1998
embassy bombings allegedly masterminded by Osama bin Laden.90
The United States defended the strikes as legally justified under
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, and claimed to have convincing
evidence that bin Laden was behind the embassy bombings and had
planned more attacks in the immediate future.9 1 In contrast to the
reaction following the Libya strikes, the international community was
92
relatively silent regarding the Afghanistan/Sudan strikes.
Understanding that self-defense has a myriad of interpretations
within the international community, Israel's "targeted killings" must
be analyzed to determine whether they qualify as legitimate selfdefense. First, if one analyzes the situation under a restrictive view of
Article 51, an armed attack against Israel must have occurred in order
for Israel to justify its actions. If the embassy bombings constituted
armed attacks, then the ongoing suicide bombings, car bombings,
mortar attacks, and drive-by-shootings carried out against Israeli

civilians should qualify as well.93 Persuasive arguments can be made
88. See id. (quoting Reagan's use of the phrase "pre-emptive action").
89. See id. at 191 (referring to Ambassador Walters's statement); see also Larry King
Live, Interview with Donald Rumsfeld, (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 5,2001), available
at http://www.cnn.comTRANSCRIPTS/0112/05/lkl.00.html ("I don't think of it as
retaliation. I think of it as self-defense. What we're doing is self-defense.") (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
90. See generally Lobel, supra note 76 (criticizing U.S. action); Ruth Wedgwood,
Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 559, 564
(1999) (arguing that the embassy bombings "were clearly 'armed attacks' that allowed
forcible measures of self-defense, even under the most stringent reading of U.N. Charter
requirements").
91. Art Pine, U.S. Targets Heart of Terror, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al; Knut
Royce, U.S. Strikes Back, NEWSDAY (New York), Aug. 21, 1998, at A38.
92. See Lobel, supra note 76, at 556-57. Lobel argues, however, that this acquiescence
is not attributable to the states' belief that the attacks were legal; rather, she attributes it to
"the general distaste for the Sudanese government coupled with a disinclination to directly
confront the United States." Id. at 556.
93. James Bennett, 15 Israelis Die in Bus Attack Militants Jailed by Arafat, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at Al (describing an attack in Haifa by a third suicide bomber in just
over twelve hours); James Bennett & Joel Greenberg, 2 Suicide Bombers Strike Jerusalem,
Killing At Least 10, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al (describing the suicide attacks as
timed to coincide with visit by U.S. envoy and retired Marine General Anthony Zinni);
Herb Keinon, 31 Killed, 475 Wounded in Capital Terror Attacks Last Year, JERUSALEM
POST, Feb. 4, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post File (reporting 209
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that, in the context of a distinctive pattern of behavior, a series of
minor assaults may be weighed in its totality and should be
considered an armed attack. 94
Undoubtedly, the number of Israeli casualties suffered during
the recent uprisings will dwarf the number of American casualties
suffered in the attacks linked to Libya in 1986 and the 1998 embassy
bombings. 95 In considering all of these factors, one can reasonably
regard the terrorist attacks against Israel as "armed attacks," thus
allowing for a forcible response in self-defense consistent with the
restrictive view of Article 51.96
Under the liberal view of Article 51, encompassing the right of
self-defense as it exists under customary international law, states can
take actions in anticipation of an imminent attack. 97 Under Webster's
formulation, the Israeli actions must meet the conditions of necessity,
proportionality, and immediacy." Arguably, Israel's actions meet all
three qualifications. First, the strikes are necessary because of the
Palestinian Authority's refusal to arrest those planning and carrying
out the attacks. 99 The pinpoint strikes are also necessary because no
terror attacks inside Israel proper, 67 of which were bombings and 48 of which were
shooting attacks). One can make an even stronger argument that the attacks against Israel
qualify as "armed attacks." The attacks against Israel affect only Israeli nationals and they
are occurring within Israeli territory as opposed to an embassy on foreign soil.
94. Y.Z. Blum, State Response to Acts of Terrorism, 19 German Yearbook of
International Law 223, 233 (1976); see also O'Brien, supra note 73, at 472 ("The referent
of proportionality for Israel thus is rarely some specific terrorist act or acts but rather the
overall pattern of past and projected acts, the accumulation of acts to which the Israelis
have been referring ever since Abba Eban's 1953 argument in the Qibya case.").
95. See William Safire, "Israel or Arafat," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A19 (quoting
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in a speech following a particularly deadly weekend of
suicide bombings as saying, "Our casualties in the past week, in proportion to the
population of the U.S.-it is as if 2,000 Americans were killed."). The idea of
proportionate casualties likely will attract more attention in the United States following
the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon.
96. See supra note 50-53 and accompanying text.
97. See DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 182 (stating that the customary right of selfdefense allowed for preventive measures taken in "anticipation" of an armed attack);
supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
98. See supranote 64-67 and accompanying text.
99. The Palestinian Authority has made a few arrests. See Serge Schmemann, Israelis
to Keep Arafat Confined, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at Al (reporting the detention of four
of the five Palestinians accused by Israel of assassinating cabinet minister Rehavam Zeevi
in October 2001). However, the Israelis are very skeptical that it is a meaningful effort.
See James Bennett, Israeli Woman Stabbed to Death in a Wave of Violence, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2002, at A6 (reporting the release of jailed militants, and quoting a senior Israeli
military official as stating, "[a]t the peak they arrested 10 out of 33 ... and now that they
let everyone run away, they don't have more than one or two"); Erik Schechter, Sharon's
Security Blueprint, JERUSALEM REP., Mar 12, 2001, at 14, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Jerusalem Report File (citing "the Authority's policy of not arresting known
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better alternative is available. For example, if Israel attempted to
arrest the terrorists, it would have to invade Palestinian-controlled

territory, inevitably leading to more loss of life, including civilians. 1°°
Second, the strikes are proportional. 01 1 The killing of one terrorist
who is planning or in the process of carrying out an attack on civilians
is proportional when compared to the death and destruction that his
elimination

will

avert.

Consistent

with

the

proportionality

requirement, Israel is cautious to avoid harm to civilians when
carrying out these strikes.) 2 For example, in the recent strike that
killed Abu Ali Mustafa, leader of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, the building housing Mustafa's office was hit,
but no one other than Mustafa was killed or injured. 0 3 Finally, the
timing element mandates that a response occur close in time to an
imminent threat or an attack.' 4 Consistent with this principle, the
period between Israel's determination that an attack is imminent and
its action to stop it usually involves only a brief time lag. 05 Although
attackers and/or freeing them soon after arrest"). The Palestinian Authority is under an
affirmative duty to arrest terrorists as part of its treaty obligations to Israel. See The Wye
River Memorandum, (Oct. 23, 1998), available at http:Ilwww.yale.edullawweb/avalonl
mideast/wyeriv.htm (stating that "the Palestinian side agreed to take all measures
necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against the
Israeli side") (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
100. See Krauthammer, supranote 5, at 32; Haberman, supra note 3.
101. See Michael Kelly, Israel is Acting with Restraint, WASH. PoST, Aug. 29, 2001, at
A21 (arguing that Israel is acting with restraint). Notably, however, the United States
criticizes Israel as using disproportionate force when it engages in other, broader forceful
measures against Palestinian installations. See Jane Perlez, Powell, with Urgency, Seeks
End to Violence, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,2001, at A6 (quoting Powell's criticism of Israel for
using "excessive and disproportionate" force against Palestinians; but this was not in
regards to targeted killings). But see Amnesty International, State Assassinations and
Other Unlawful Killings, supra note 13 (reporting the findings by Amnesty delegates that
some of those killed could have been arrested, and that some uninvolved Palestinians were
killed in addition to those specifically targeted) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
102. See generally Friedman, supra note 3 (describing precise nature of the attacks);
Haberman, supra note 3 (reporting an Israeli official's regret that two small boys died in
an attack).
103. See Kelly, supra note 100. Kelly also makes the point that Israel has the military
might to eliminate totally the forces of all the Palestinian terror groups, yet the only lethal
force employed is the "targeted killings of Palestinians identified by Israel as directly
involved in attacks on Israelis." Id.
104. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of InternationalRules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 113, 132 (1986) (suggesting that the idea of self-defense contains a temporal
element).
105. It would be nearly impossible for there to be instant responses. The military
forces would have to be deployed everywhere at all times in order to anticipate where an
attack might possibly occur. Plus, trying to have instantaneous military responses would
undoubtedly reduce the civilian political oversight of the armed forces.
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the strikes may not meet everyone's definition of "immediate," the
fundamental principle is that extended delays are prohibited;
1°6
otherwise the use of force may be more in the nature of a reprisal.
Finally, Israel's actions would likely qualify as defensive armed
reprisals, as opposed to the traditional armed reprisals prohibited by
the U.N. Charter. Israeli authorities employ the strikes as a measure
to prevent future attacks by eliminating the source of the attack
107
directly. Defensive armed reprisals also serve a deterrent function.
The wave of suicide bombings presents a major threat to Israel, and
because one cannot target a suicide bomber after he has carried out
his mission, these strikes manifestly are not punitive in character.
Israel's refusal to engage in a punitive armed response to the
Dolphinarium bombing presents a pertinent example of its adherence
to international norms. 08 Instead of mounting a massive retaliation
in response to the horrible attack that specifically targeted teenagers,
Israel accepted an American-brokered cease-fire agreement. °9 The
fact that no massive retaliation or increased number of "targeted
killings" immediately followed the bombing supports Israel's
assertions that it carries out these strikes to prevent future attacks.
Having analyzed Israel's policy of "targeted killings" in terms of
assassination and self-defense, it is easy to arrive at the conclusion
that the strikes are not "assassinations" in the legal sense. Even
without the emotions stirred by the September 11, 2001 attacks
against the United States, Israel's use of "targeted killings" should
not be condemned. Rather, these actions qualify as a legitimate form
of self-defense in Israel's ongoing war against terrorism directed
against its civilians.
J. NICHOLAS KENDALL

106. The extended delay would thus mean that the responding state did not meet all
the requirements of legitimate self-defense, e.g., immediacy. See supra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text.
107. DINSTEIN, supra note 50, at 222 (citing R.W. Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense:
The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 586, 591 (1972)). "A signal that playing with fire
constitutes a dangerous game is what most armed reprisals are all about." Id.
108. See David Rudge, 18 Dead, More Than 90 Wounded by Suicide Bomber,
JERUSALEM POST, June 3, 2001 at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, Jerusalem Post
File.
109. See Charles Krauthammer, Arafat's War: How to End It, WKLY. STANDARD,
Sept. 3, 2001, at 25 (discussing Prime Minister Sharon's restraint after the suicide
bombing).

